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Abstract 
From 1876 until 1964, the Democratic Party held virtual dictatorial control over the 
American South. Beginning after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that year’s 
presidential candidacy of anti-Civil Rights Act Republican Barry Goldwater, the South shifted 
reliably into the Republican column for presidential elections. Democrats still held a majority of 
all other offices in the region until the mid-1990s. This paper examines public opinion data in the 
American South, as well as partisan change in four Southern states, with an emphasis on the first 
time each state elected a Republican governor. I find that in each state, local issues played a 
major role in the election of the first Republican governor, and that one or several powerful 
statewide Democrats could stave off the party’s decline in the state. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 In American politics, the Solid South refers to the dominance of the Democratic Party in 
the American South following the end of Reconstruction. The region was for all intents and 
purposes a one-party region, voting Democratic at levels that were virtually dictatorial. 
Beginning in 1964, the South began to undo a generation of this dominance, and rapidly voted 
just as reliably for Republican presidential candidates as they once had for Democrats. However, 
at this same time, Democrats held a majority of the region’s congressional seats, Senate seats, 
and governor’s mansions – a majority they would hold until the mid-1990s. This raises an 
interesting question – why did Southerners split their tickets for so long, and when they stopped 
doing it, what caused them to? 
 To examine this problem, I look at four Southern states with differing partisan histories – 
Alabama, Arkansas, South Carolina and Virginia. I examine events in the states’ politics 
following the candidacy of Barry Goldwater, and pay close attention to the events surrounding 
the first time each state elected their first Republican governor. While existing scholarship on the 
South’s partisan change talks a great deal about how the Republican Party became dramatically 
more conservative, I hypothesize that there were other issues at play in these elections. I refer to 
these issues as “local issues,” and define them as issues that cannot be neatly placed on a liberal-
conservative scale. I find that many of these issues were present in each state’s first election of a 
Republican governor – in some states, the Democratic Party had a primary election that left the 
party divided into factions, and in some the Republican appealed to voters by running as a 
“reformer” against the entrenched Democratic machine. 
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 To support my hypothesis that focusing on the role the region’s ideology played in its 
eventual partisan change, I examined public opinion data of the South from the 1960s until the 
present. Southerners were asked what political party they considered themselves aligned with, 
and what ideology they considered themselves – liberal, moderate, or conservative. Over time, 
many more Southerners began to self-identify as Republicans. However, there was no 
corresponding dramatic shift in Southerners considering themselves conservatives – the numbers 
stayed fairly stagnant, and the percentage considering themselves conservatives never rose above 
40 percent. My argument is that because of the lack of an ideological shift, and the lack of a 
conservative majority in the South, the partisan shift cannot be purely attributed to the 
Republican Party becoming more conservative.  
 When examining the four states, I found one common thread. Each state had one or 
several popular Democrats who held power in the state for a significant amount of time – figures 
I refer to as “party bosses.” In Arkansas and Alabama, the Democratic bosses faded from the 
political scene late in the 20th century, in the 1980s and 1990s. In Virginia and South Carolina, 
the Democratic bosses either became a Republican in the 1960s, elevating the party in the state, 
or died around the same time, creating a power vacuum. I then examined state legislative control 
in the four states and found that in the states that had a boss present for a longer amount of time, 
Democrats did not lose their control of the state house and senate until the 21st century. In those 
where the boss became a Republican or died in the 1960s, Democrats lost control in the 1970s or 
1980s. I hypothesize that what this means is that the presence of a powerful, popular Democrat 
could improve the party’s brand in the state.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
On Election Night 1994, the Republican Party swept the nation, winning 54 seats in the 
House of Representatives and eight in the Senate. For the first time in 40 years, the Grand Old 
Party controlled the House and the Senate. The next day, Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, a 
conservative Democrat, stood beside the next Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, and announced 
that he was switching parties – and becoming a Republican. 
 “I thought that there was room in the Democratic Party for a conservative Southern 
Democrat such as myself representing my people from Alabama and other areas in the South,” 
said Shelby. “But I can tell you that there is not.”1 
From Reconstruction until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Democrats 
dominated presidential elections in the former Confederacy. While Republican presidential 
candidates occasionally won states in the Outer South, the Deep South stood solidly in the 
Democratic column.2 The South’s loyalty to the Democratic Party was so reliable that the region 
was known as the “Solid South.” Beginning in 1948, when third party candidate Strom 
Thurmond won four states in the formerly impenetrable Deep South, the presidential Solid South 
began to crack. In 1952 and 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower captured the Outer South. In 1964 and 
1968, Republican and third-party candidates won several states in the Deep South. Then, Richard 
Nixon won the entire South, along with most of the country, in his 1972 landslide victory. 
                                                 
1 CSPAN Transcript, Senator Shelby Switch to the Republican Party, November 9,1994 
2 The Outer South is generally defined as Texas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida and Texas, 
while the Deep South is known as South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi and 
Louisiana. 
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Between then and 2004, no Democratic presidential candidate carried a Southern state except for 
native Southerners Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. 
 A comparable decline of Southern Democratic strength in other political offices did not 
occur until much later. Before the 1964 Civil Rights Act, dominance by the Democratic Party in 
the South in state and local offices was even more extensive than it was in presidential contests. 
In 1950, every single Southern governor and U.S. Senator was a Democrat, along with 98 
percent of the members of Congress.3 While dominance in state and local offices waned from the 
virtual unanimity once displayed, majority Democratic control was present in the South as late as 
1990. In that year, Republicans controlled only 30.3 percent of the region’s statewide offices 
(governor and U.S. Senator) and 33.6 percent of the region’s U.S. House seats.4  
5 
                                                 
3 Merle Black, “The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party,” Journal of Politics 66, 
no. 4 (November 2004) 
4 Alexander P. Lamis, Southern Politics in the 1990s (Louisiana State University Press, 1999), p. 
31 
5 Data from US Census, US Senate 
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Following the 1994 elections, Democratic control plummeted to 30.3 percent of statewide 
offices (Fig. 1) and 43.2 percent of House seats (Fig. 2.).6 Even with native Arkansan Bill 
Clinton running at the top of the ticket, support for Southern Democrats for down-ballot offices 
decreased, and the number of Southern Democrats in office fell dramatically from 1990 to 1996. 
However, this decline in Democratic state and local control in the South came more than 20 
years after the trend had emerged in presidential elections. This means that for two decades, 
Southern voters were splitting their tickets, voting for Republicans for president, but Democrats 
for most other offices. This trend raises two important question: why did Southerners split their 
tickets for so long, and why did the ultimate shift – the delayed transition – to Republican control 
at all levels eventually occur? 
 
                                                 
6 Lamis, Southern Politics in the 1990s, p. 32 
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 My hypothesis is twofold. First, I believe that an overlooked factor in scholarship of 
the Southern realignment is ideological tension. While the South was effectively a one-
party region for many years, it was not and is not a one-ideology region. Vigorous policy 
debates took place in the politics of the Southern states – they just took place within the 
Democratic primaries rather than in general election contests.8 Because of the broad 
ideological spectrum within the Democratic Party during its years of dominance, I argue 
that the ultimate shift could not have been driven purely by ideology.  
 Secondly, I believe that local issues played a key role in the South’s shift. In the 
context of my argument, “local issues” are issues in a state that did not become the subjects 
                                                 
7 Source: US House of Representatives 
8 Numan Bartley and Hugh Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 25 
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of national ideological debates. For example, busing and school desegregation were 
Southern issues that became polarizing national debates. Scholars such as Black, Valentino 
and Sears cite these issues as motivating factors for the South’s partisan shift. Fighting 
busing and integration were causes near and dear to the hearts of Southern Democrats, and 
in the 1960s, some national Republicans seized them in an effort to win over the South. In 
doing so, these issues were laid fairly neatly on an ideological scale: those who were 
generally liberal could be expected to support integration and busing, those who were 
generally conservative could be expected to oppose them. Additionally, demographics are 
credited with speeding up the shift. As Northerners moved into Southern cities and the 
region became less agrarian, Republicans found more fertile ground for their economically 
conservative message.  
Then there are issues that are present in nearly every campaign, but don’t fit neatly 
on an ideological or partisan scale. Sometimes a party primary may include unusually 
intense intra-party squabbling. Sometimes a candidate may run against a corrupt governor 
or a corrupt governor’s chosen candidate on a pledge to “clean up government.” In the 
South, sometimes there are heated debates over whether to fly a Confederate flag on state 
property. All of these issues are local or state issues that don’t always fit neatly into a 
Republican-Democrat paradigm. In the South, no ideology has enough support to win an 
election all by itself (see page 21). Because of this, I believe non-ideological issues could 
have been an important and even decisive factor in the South’s ultimate partisan shift. 
Viewing the South’s shift through a national lens tells only part of the story. Instead, I 
propose a case study of four Southern states with different partisan histories to look more 
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closely at how local issues and ideological tension shaped the partisan shift, and to see if 
any regional patterns emerge.  
 The four states I intend to look at are Alabama, Arkansas, South Carolina and 
Virginia – one state from the Outer South and three from the Deep South. Each state was a 
reliable Democratic vote in presidential elections. However, Virginia was decidedly less so, 
voting Republican in several landslide elections after Reconstruction. In 1964, two of the 
four – South Carolina and Alabama – voted for Republican Barry Goldwater, while Virginia 
and Arkansas stayed with Democrat Lyndon Johnson. None of the four voted Democrat in 
1968, as Alabama and Arkansas voted for third-party candidate George Wallace and 
Virginia and South Carolina supported Republican Richard Nixon.  
 
First Republican Victories in Each State:9 
 Alabama Arkansas South Carolina Virginia 
President 1964 1972 1964 1928 
Senator 1980 1996 1966 1972 
Governor 1986 1966 1974 1969 
 
Down the ballot, the states varied in when they elected their first Republican 
senator and governor. Virginia elected a moderate Republican governor in 1969 following 
the demise of the Byrd Organization, similar to Alabama first electing a Republican 
governor after the last term of George Wallace. Arkansas also elected a moderate 
Republican in the 1960s, while South Carolina took until 1974 following a controversial 
                                                 
9 Post-Reconstruction 
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Democratic primary. In the Senate, South Carolina was the first to support a Republican 
when it reelected former Democrat Strom Thurmond. Virginia followed in 1972, again as 
the state’s Democratic Party struggled to rebuild itself. Alabama elected one Republican in 
1980 during the first Reagan landslide, while Arkansas took until 1996 following the 
retirement of popular Democrat David Pryor. 
 South Carolina saw party switching begin much earlier than other states, as Senator 
Strom Thurmond became a Republican in 1964. In the years that followed, Democrats 
dominated other offices, but fighting within their own ranks as well as weak and 
controversial candidates allowed Republicans to make inroads in conservative, rural, 
traditionally Democratic counties.10 Virginia saw the decline of the powerful Byrd 
organization, which fractured the Democratic Party and led to the election of Republican 
Governor Linwood Holton in 1969, followed by a moderate, biracial Democratic coalition 
developing in the 1980s.11 Virginia was also the first Southern state to swing noticeably 
back into the Democratic column, as it is currently represented by two Democratic senators 
and a Democratic governor. Additionally, the Commonwealth voted for President Obama 
twice, and was the only Southern state to vote for Hillary Clinton in 2016.  
In Alabama, the Democratic Party, and therefore the state, was unquestionably ruled 
by one man: Governor George Corley Wallace. However, the former segregationist moved 
with the times, as in his 1982 reelection campaign he repudiated his former views, winning 
90 percent of the black vote in the general election.12 Arkansas was dominated statewide 
by Democrats as late as 2008 – and voted for native son Bill Clinton twice for president. 
                                                 
10 Lamis, Southern Politics in the 1990s, p. 59 
11 Lamis, Southern Politics in the 1990s, p. 15 
12 Lamis, Southern Politics in the 1990s, p. 22 
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However, it was controlled for years by local county organizations as well as organizations 
of the “Big Three” politicians of the state – Democrats Dale Bumpers, David Pryor and Bill 
Clinton – rather than strictly by a party organization. 
In the presidential elections that chipped away at the Solid South, these four states 
voted differently. 1948 saw Alabama and South Carolina cast their votes for Dixiecrat 
Strom Thurmond – who was listed on the ballot as the Democratic Party candidate – while 
Virginia and Arkansas stayed with Harry Truman. Alabama, Arkansas and South Carolina 
never voted for the Republican Eisenhower, while Virginia voted for him both times. Barry 
Goldwater captured South Carolina and Alabama, but lost Virginia and Arkansas in 1964, 
becoming the first Republican candidate post-Reconstruction to win in the Deep South. 
Finally, George Wallace won Alabama and Arkansas in 1968, while Virginia and South 
Carolina voted for Richard Nixon. That year, none of the four states voted Democratic. 
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Chapter 2 
The South as a Whole 
 
When examining Southern political history, it is important to recognize that there were 
indeed Southern Republicans even in the age of the Solid Democratic South. Outer South states 
supported Republican presidential candidates in strong Republican years, such as 1952 and 1956, 
when the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket carried Virginia, Texas, Florida and Tennessee.13 The base of 
Southern Republicans was a group known as “mountain Republicans” – farmers in the Outer 
South whose ancestors during the Civil War had opposed secession.14 As urbanization led to an 
increase in migrants to the South, many middle- and upper-class suburban and urban dwellers 
swelled the ranks of the minority party. Ironically, in recent years Southern states such as 
Virginia and North Carolina have experienced another surge of new residents fitting this profile. 
This time, however, it has led to increased support for Democratic candidates in those states. 
Successful Republican candidates were often moderate, particularly on the racial issues that 
traditionally plagued Southern politics.15 The ideological makeup of the party began to change in 
1964 with the candidacy of Barry Goldwater. 
 Goldwater, running on a staunchly conservative platform that opposed the Civil Rights 
Act, was the first Republican to ever win the Deep South. With the exception of Georgia, which 
Thurmond lost, Goldwater’s Southern victories were a mirror image of Strom Thurmond’s 1948 
Dixiecrat candidacy. At the same time as Republicans achieved unprecedented success in the 
                                                 
13 Jack Bass and Walter Devries, The Transformation of Southern Politics (University of Georgia 
Press, 1995), p. 26 
14 Bass and Devries, The Transformation of Southern Politics, p. 25 
15 Bass and Devries, The Transformation of Southern Politics, p. 26 
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Deep South, their support declined among their traditional base in the mountains.16 As Southern 
Republicans began to find success, eschewing moderate coalitions to become more uniformly 
conservative, Southern Democrats began to shift ideologically as well. This shift and the impact 
of Barry Goldwater on Southern Republicanism is demonstrated by votes to renew the 1965 
Voting Rights Act, which was opposed by Southern Democrats during its original passage. In 
1975, two-thirds of Southern Democratic representatives voted for the law’s extension. At the 
same time, two-thirds of Southern Republicans voted against it.17 The two parties in the South 
had realigned. 
Existing scholarship on the shifting partisan identification of the South largely focuses on 
ideology and demographic trends. Earl and Merle Black cite a diversifying economy as driving 
the development of two-party competition. As the South urbanized, many city-dwelling middle 
to upper class voters found a home with the Republican Party, giving it newfound life in the 
region.18  
Additionally, they cite Ronald Reagan as a powerful influence. While Richard Nixon 
swept the South in 1972, his Watergate scandal and subsequent resignation allowed much of the 
South to swing back into the Democratic column in 1976 – voting for native Southerner Jimmy 
Carter. Under President Reagan, Black and Black find that under Reagan, more and more 
conservative and moderate white Southerners began to consider themselves Republicans – the 
number nearly doubled.19 Many who still considered themselves independents or conservative 
                                                 
16 Bass and Devries, The Transformation of Southern Politics, p. 28 
17 Bass and Devries, The Transformation of Southern Politics, p. 38 
18 Merle Black and Earl Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Harvard University Press, 
2009), p. 23  
19 Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, p. 26 
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Democrats nonetheless supported Reagan. Reagan’s impact continued in 1988, as George H.W. 
Bush carried the entire South – all by larger margins than Reagan in 1980.20 
Another issue that saw a great deal of change in the South, and in turn affected partisan 
realignment, was race. Race issues are credited with driving Southern whites out of the 
Democratic Party. An old story, possibly apocryphal, says that after President Lyndon B. 
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he turned to an aide and said “we just lost the South 
for a generation.”21 The enfranchisement of Southern blacks via the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
changed the party’s face. Following the VRA, Southern blacks reliably supported the Democratic 
Party, while at the same time, the percentage of Southern whites, particularly men, who 
identified as Democrats began to plummet.22 Sears and Valentino conclude, “Racial 
conservatism has become more tightly linked to both Republican presidential voting and 
party identification in the South.”23 Southern Democrats in Congress responded to the 
influx of black Southern Democrats accordingly. While only a third of House Southern 
Democrats supported federal voting rights legislation in 1965, that number had 
skyrocketed to over 90 percent by 1981 – far outpacing Southern House Republicans who 
supported the same legislation.24 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, p. 26 
21 Nichols, When the Republicans Really Were the Party of Lincoln, The Nation 
22 Merle Black, “The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party,” Journal of Politics 66, 
no. 4 (November 2004) 
23 Nicholas A. Valentino and David O. Sears, “Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and 
Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South,” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 
3 (July 2005)  
24 James Lea, Contemporary Southern Politics (Louisiana State University Press, 1988), p. 187 
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Chapter 3 
The Southern Strategy 
 
In the 1968 presidential election, Richard Nixon and the Republican Party made a 
conscious effort to appeal to Southerners on racial issues. Nixon promised to maintain 
Goldwater’s “state’s rights” policies on racial issues while meeting with South Carolina 
Senator Strom Thurmond in Atlanta.25 With the staunchly segregationist Wallace showing 
surprisingly broad appeal, Nixon made a play for his voters, speaking in favor of “slow-
walking” busing and school desegregation while touting “law and order” issues.26 This 
campaign, as well as the Republican Party’s “Operation Dixie” effort to recruit more 
segregationist candidates, was the beginning of what was known as the Southern Strategy. 
The Southern Strategy was a top-down push for the Republican Party to become 
competitive in the South. It was a strategy made up of both rhetoric and policy. Astrup 
characterizes it as a two-pronged approach to appeal to two powerful voting blocs in the 
South. Republicans advocated conservative economic values on taxes and spending to 
appeal to the burgeoning group of wealthy, educated, city-dwelling Southerners – a group 
known as the New South, which geographically was mostly concentrated in the Outer 
South. At the same time, Republican candidates spoke out in favor of racially and socially 
conservative values – “family values” issues such as abortion and prayer, and racial issues 
such as busing and school desegregation – in an effort to win over the traditionally 
                                                 
25 Joseph Aistrup, The Southern Strategy Revisited (The University Press of Kentucky, 2015), p. 
18 
26 Reg Murphy and Hal Gulliver, The Southern Strategy (Scribner, 1971), p. 24 
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Democratic, working class, and less educated Southerners – the Old South, which was 
almost synonymous with the Deep South.27  
In 1964, Barry Goldwater made a strong push for Old South voters, remarking 
“we’re not going to win the Negro vote, so we might as well go hunting where the ducks 
are.”28 In that election, the ducks were in Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Georgia 
and Alabama, all of which supported Goldwater after never voting for a Republican 
before.29 However, Goldwater was unable to forge a winning coalition with New South 
voters, losing the Outer South. In the following presidential election, Republican Richard 
Nixon, while winning the election, had the reverse problem in the South; he won over New 
South voters, but the presence of the segregationist Southerner Wallace prevented him 
from winning the Old South.30 Once in office, however, Nixon opposed busing, spoke out in 
favor of “law and order,” and criticized the welfare system – all of which had the effect of 
implicitly invoking the issue of race.31 The strategy worked – Nixon unified the Old and 
New South in an electoral landslide in 1972. It continued through the Reagan years, as 
Reagan announced his candidacy in Philadelphia, Mississippi – the town where three civil 
rights activists were murdered. Reagan said, “I believe in states’ rights,” and campaigned on 
a solidly conservative economic platform, while at the same time appealing to religious 
groups on conservative social issues, continuing the success of Nixon.32 
                                                 
27 Astrup, The Southern Strategy Revisited, p. 22 
28 Astrup, The Southern Strategy Revisisted, p. 30 
29 “Never before” here refers to modern political history, as some of the states voted Republican 
while under military governorship during Reconstruction 
30 Astrup, The Southern Strategy Revisited, p. 32 
31 Astrup, The Southern Strategy Revisited, p. 36-37 
32 Astrup, The Southern Strategy Revisited, p. 48-49 
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The top-down effort extended beyond merely running candidates. In 1970, national 
Republican officials courted segregationist Georgia Governor Lester Maddox, a Democrat, 
to switch parties and become a Republican.33 Maddox ultimately declined. When the wave 
finally trickled down to local offices in the 1994 Republican wave, Lamis credits national 
Republicans like Newt Gingrich, a Southern congressman, for emphasizing conservative 
economic issues and attacking President Clinton’s failed health care overhaul, as well as 
blaming the “counterculture. Both of these, Lamis argues, appealed to Southern voters, who 
generally speaking were culturally and economically conservative.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Murphy and Gulliver, The Southern Strategy, p. 4 
34 Lamis, Southern Politics in the 1990s, p. 43 
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Chapter 4 
Congressional Power 
 
Congressional Southern Democrats had a practical reason to remain within the 
party of their fathers for so long. Over the years, thanks to the seniority system in the 
House and the Senate, Southerners had built up clout and influence in Congress far beyond 
the area’s comparatively meager population and representation. The lack of serious 
general election challenges meant that for the most part, when Southern Democrats went 
to Congress, they stayed in Congress. These Southerners therefore developed seniority, and 
the opportunity to chair powerful committees. In the 1960s, when Democrats consistently 
held a majority in the House and Senate, Southerners never held fewer than 57 percent of 
congressional committee chairs – yet at the same time, they never held more than 40 
percent of the seats in the House Democratic Caucus.35 
  In the early 1970s, this strong influence began to wane for two reasons. The first 
was a series of congressional reforms that decentralized and redistributed power from 
committees to subcommittees, and subsequently limited the number of subcommittee 
chairmanships any one member was allowed to hold.36 At the same time, those Southern 
Democrats who had built up such seniority and power in Congress began to retire, lose 
primaries, or die off. Therefore, new entrants into politics in Southern states had another 
factor to consider: both in the South and once in Congress, being a Democrat simply did not 
carry as much weight as it once did. 
                                                 
35 C.S Bullock III, “The South in Congress,” Contemporary Southern Politics (Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988), p. 179 
36 Bullock, The South in Congress,” Contemporary Southern Politics (Louisiana State University 
Press, 1988), p. 181 
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Chapter 5 
Partisan vs. Ideology Self-Identification 
 
An important distinction must be made when discussing historical partisan 
identification – both in the South and elsewhere. Democrat did not always necessarily 
mean liberal, and Republican did not always necessarily mean conservative. For years, both 
parties had a rich tradition of differing ideologies – the Republicans had a strong foothold 
with liberal New Englanders, and the Democrats with conservative Southerners. Data from 
the General Social Survey demonstrate how ideology and partisanship historically have not 
necessarily overlapped.37 From 1972 until 1986, a majority of the country – 53.6 percent – 
said that they thought of themselves as Democrats.38 Yet only 25.7 percent said that their 
political views were liberal. An overwhelming majority – 69.4 percent – described 
themselves as either moderate or conservative.39 The country’s majority party may have 
been Democratic, but the majority ideology in the country and in the party was certainly 
not liberal. 
 Over time, polarization of the two parties increased. On a liberal-conservative 
dimension (Fig. 3), the DW-NOMINATE scores for each party’s House delegation steadily 
marched toward the political poles, although the Republican Party moved much further to 
                                                 
37 The GSS is an annual sociological survey in the United States that asks, among other 
things, questions about individuals’ political ideology and partisan affiliation. 
38 The General Social Survey, 1972-1986, p. 134 
39 General Social Survey, 1972-1986, p. 135 
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the right than the Democratic Party did to the left. The parties’ Senate delegations saw a 
similar trend (Fig. 4). 40 
 
 41 
 
 
                                                 
40 On a scale of -1 to 1, can be interpreted as an ideological scale. A DW-NOMINATE score of -
1 is very liberal, a score of 1 is very conservative. 
41 Data Source: “The Polarization of the Congressional Parties.” VoteView.com, 
http://voteview.com/Political_Polarization_2014.htm 
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 When examining trends of Southern Democrats over the same time period, an 
interesting trend emerges. While Southern Democrats also became decidedly more liberal, 
both in the House (Fig. 5) and Senate (Fig. 6), they have also consistently been more 
conservative than the national Democratic Party, particularly in the Senate. In other words, 
what was true in 1965 remained true over time – a Southern Democrat does not always 
look like a national Democrat. However, an important caveat demonstrated by the data is 
that while Southern Democrats remained more conservative than the national party, over 
time their ideology moved far closer to that of the national party. 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Data Source: “The Polarization of the Congressional Parties.” VoteView.com, 
http://voteview.com/Political_Polarization_2014.htm 
19 
 
 
43 
44 
                                                 
43 Data Source: “The Polarization of the Congressional Parties.” VoteView.com, 
http://voteview.com/Political_Polarization_2014.htm 
44 Data Source: “The Polarization of the Congressional Parties.” VoteView.com, 
http://voteview.com/Political_Polarization_2014.htm 
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At the same time that elected Southern Democrats were becoming more liberal, 
while remaining more conservative than national Democrats, a shift in partisan 
identification was taking place among Southerners. Southerners were rapidly leaving the 
Democratic Party, and more and more were identifying as Republicans (Fig. 7).  
45 
 It is important to note, and I believe is usually overlooked, that this major partisan 
shift was not accompanied by a major ideological shift. Even as Southerners became 
dramatically more Republican, ideologies among Southerners remained relatively 
consistent (Fig. 8). Additionally, a plurality of Southerners still claims allegiance to the 
Democratic Party.46 Despite a strong culture of organized religion and economic 
conservatism from its politicians, the South is not, and has never been, a majority 
                                                 
45 The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). THE ANES GUIDE TO 
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 
Center for Political Studies 
46 The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). THE ANES GUIDE TO 
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 
Center for Political Studies 
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conservative region. Generally speaking, the GSS has found a plurality of Southerners calls 
themselves conservative, though the number identifying themselves as moderates has 
occasionally outpaced conservatives. While that plurality increased over time, it did not do 
so dramatically. In fact, during the 1990s, the decade in which Southern Democrats 
suffered their most significant down-ballot losses, the percentage of Southerners self-
identifying as moderates or liberals rose, while the percentage self-identifying as 
conservatives actually went down. In other words, Southerners did not become more 
Republican because they became more conservative. The people were not changing, but 
their partisan identification was. 
 
47 
                                                 
47 The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). THE ANES GUIDE TO 
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 
Center for Political Studies 
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 Without a shift in ideology among Southerners, there are two possible explanations 
for this partisan shift. One is that as the Republican Party became dramatically more 
conservative (Figs. 3, 4), Southerners saw that it better represented their ideological views. 
Another is that other, non-ideological factors affected the region’s partisan shift – in other 
words, what I refer to as “local issues.” It is difficult to prove definitively which of these 
hypotheses explains the partisan shift of the South. However, I argue that a flaw in the 
ideological consolidation theory is that according to the GSS, conservatives have never 
been a majority in the South. In fact, they have never made up more than 40 percent of 
Southerners. Additionally, the fact that elected Southern Democrats have remained more 
conservative than their national counterparts suggests that they were not necessarily voted 
out of office on the basis of their ideology.  
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Chapter 6 
Ideological Tension 
 
Each state I profile had ideological tension within the Democratic Party during the 
days of the Solid South – tension that continued as the states moved toward competitive 
two-party systems. In the days before George Wallace formed a white, conservative 
Democratic Party in the state, Alabama had a remarkable populist streak, in part driven by 
organized labor. Their congressional delegation in the 1930s mostly supported Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, none more ardently than Senator and future Supreme Court Justice 
Hugo Black.48 In the 1940s, outspoken populist Jim Folsom was elected governor. Standing 
six feet, eight inches tall, “Big Jim” was known as “the little man’s big friend,” and bear-
hugged labor en route to a surprising victory.49 Despite this populist tradition, Alabama’s 
                                                 
48 Robert J. Norrell, “Labor at the Ballot Box: Alabama Politics from the New Deal to the 
Dixiecrat Movement,” The Journal of Southern History 57, no. 2 (May 1991) p. 206 
49 Norrell, Labor at the Ballot Box, p. 230 
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appetite for liberalism had its limits. While in office, Folsom made a concerted effort to 
register black Alabamians to vote.50 This played a significant role in his later defeat at the 
hands of his protégé George Wallace, who vowed after an earlier losing campaign to “never 
be out-niggered again.”51 Even in Wallace’s own career there was ideological tension. Early 
on, his coalition resembled a traditionally conservative, white Southern Democratic one. 
Toward the end, notably after passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, he brought liberals 
and African Americans into the fold.52  
While the Big Three of Arkansas politics (see page 26) could be accurately described 
as moderate, New South Democrats, they were by no means representative of the entire 
state. Arkansas’ Democratic Party, like that of other Southern states, boasted successful 
politicians who ran the ideological gamut from the populist progressive Dale Bumpers, who 
cast votes in the Senate against bills allowing school prayer and outlawing flag burning, to 
the segregationist Governor Orval Faubus, whose defiance of Brown v. Board of Education 
plunged Little Rock into violent racial unrest. In Arkansas, this ideological tension was also 
historically sectional tension. Dividing the state in a diagonal line from the northeastern to 
southwestern corners produces the two distinct regions of Arkansas politics. Voters in the 
southern part of the state – the Delta region – tended to be much more conservative.53 This 
was the area of the state that prior to the Civil War was dotted with sprawling cotton 
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plantations. In the north, in urban areas like Little Rock as well as the Ozark Mountains, 
progressive populism found fertile ground where cotton did not. 
Perhaps more than any other state, Arkansas voters saw no issue electing officials 
from broadly differing, even diametrically opposed points of view. They simultaneously 
elected and reelected Senator J. William Fulbright who, while a relatively quiet 
segregationist, was also a liberal internationalist, and the archconservative, race-baiting 
Faubus. The best example of this came in 1968. That year, Arkansas reelected the Democrat 
Fulbright, reelected Republican Governor Winthrop Rockefeller, and cast its presidential 
votes for Independent George Wallace. 
Virginia is a curious case, ideologically speaking, and it is that way partially due to 
in-migration. In recent years, it has seen the migration of a large number of transplants 
from outside the South into the Washington, DC suburbs. Less than half of Virginians today 
were born in the Commonwealth, and only an additional ten percent were born in other 
Southern states – compared to 1960, when 82 percent of Virginians were native 
Southerners.54 This change in backgrounds of the residents has corresponded with a 
change in the Commonwealth’s politics – Virginia is the only Southern state to boast a 
Democratic governor and two Democratic senators. The result of this is ideological tension 
between the metropolitan, liberal suburbs of Washington, DC and conservative rural areas, 
but the tension is nothing new. The suburbs were already growing during the era of Harry 
Byrd’s “Massive Resistance” to integration, and they had no appetite for shutting down 
                                                 
54 Aisch, Gregor, Robert Gebeloff and Kevin Quealy. “Where We Came From and Where We 
Went, State by State.” New York Times, August 2014. 
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their schools rather than integrating them.55 These suburbs, and the other cities that made 
up the “urban corridor” of the state, routinely voted for conservative Byrd Organization 
candidates at far lower rates than the rest of the state, creating a political problem for Byrd, 
and ideological tension for the Democratic Party.56 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Alabama 
 
Alabama’s politics from the 1960s onward can be divided between pre- and post-
George Wallace eras. From 1962 until 1986, Wallace controlled the governor’s mansion of 
the state in his own right or by proxy – in 1966, unable to succeed himself due to term 
limits, his wife Lurleen ran in his stead on a platform to “let George do it.” The power and 
popularity of Wallace meant that little opposition could gain a foothold – both within the 
Democratic Party and the virtually nonexistent Republican Party in the state.57 This 
stymying of electoral competition is the chief explanation for the long delay in Alabama’s 
Republican Party’s rise to prominence. In the years bookended by Wallace’s terms as 
governor – between 1963 and 1987 – only two Republicans were elected as Governor or 
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Senator in Alabama. Republican Senator Jeremiah Denton served one term after winning in 
the 1980 Reagan landslide, and Guy Hunt was elected Governor to replace Wallace in 1986. 
Of the 11 statewide elections won by Democrats during this time period, the average 
margin of victory was 41.43 points.58 
 The role of Wallace’s influence in Alabama’s partisan identification cannot be 
overstated. Following 1964, conditions appeared ripe for Republicans to become 
competitive in Alabama. Barry Goldwater won the state with nearly 70 percent of the vote, 
making significant gains among rural and conservative whites – groups in the state that 
were traditionally Democratic.59 In the years that followed, Wallace shifted his political 
tactics and, ultimately, his political coalition. He curried favor with labor unions, and even 
began a process of racial reconciliation, earning endorsements of several black elected 
officials.60  
 When the state ultimately elected a Republican senator, it came in 1980 on the 
coattails of Ronald Reagan’s impressive performance in carrying the state. Yet the election 
of Republican Jeremiah Denton led to another example of local events shaping the election. 
Denton was defeated for reelection after being criticized for long absences from the state – 
he explained he “had more important things to do than to come back to Alabama and kiss 
babies’ butts.”61  
At the same time, Republican Guy Hunt was elected to the governor’s mansion. 
Much like South Carolina’s first elected Republican governor, this came after a bitter 
Democratic primary had fractured the party. Attorney General Charles Graddick had won, 
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but after the election it was discovered that he had encouraged Republicans to vote in the 
Democratic Primary. As a result, the state committee nominated the runner-up – 
Lieutenant Governor Bill Baxley. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Arkansas 
 
Of the four states profiled, Arkansas had perhaps the strongest Democratic tradition. 
It did not vote for a Republican until 1972. Its first Republican senator did not come until 
the mid 1990s, and its state legislature did not fall to the GOP until the 2000s. One office 
where Republicans did have early success was the governor’s mansion, as Republican 
Winthrop Rockefeller captured the office in 1966. Winthrop Rockefeller, however, was no 
typical Republican, and 1966 was no typical race. In the first place, while Arkansas, like 
much of the South, was ancestrally Democratic and viewed Republicans as outsiders and 
carpetbaggers, Rockefeller undercut this narrative. He had already been in business in the 
state for a decade, and had created hundreds of businesses and thousands of jobs for the 
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state.62 Additionally, the 1965 Voting Rights Act left the state’s black population eligible to 
vote, and over 70 percent supported Rockefeller.  
To the extent that Rockefeller’s win can be credited to issues, they were 
quintessentially local ones. Polls in the state showed voters were concerned about 
education, roads and bridges, and employment.63 There was a fourth issue at hand, as well. 
Rockefeller’s likely Democratic opponent at first was former Governor Orval Faubus, who 
had served six terms in office and was infamous for his role in the Little Rock integration 
crisis. While Faubus ultimately did not run, Rockefeller successfully cast himself as running 
against his Democratic machine, which voters worried had sown racial unrest and could 
harm the state’s image and community.64 Years later, Rockefeller would attribute his 
victory to Arkansans “voting against a system that they had wearied of.”65  After being 
reelected over another segregationist Democrat, Rockefeller’s time in office came to an end 
as voters tired of his fights with the legislature and his alcoholism.66 His loss came in a 
landslide at the hands of Dale Bumpers, and a new era in Arkansas politics began. 
 The next several decades in Arkansas were marked by the power of the “Big Three” 
– Democrats Bumpers, Bill Clinton, and David Pryor. The Big Three were not invincible – 
they lost several races, including some crushing upsets. In general, however, they were 
highly effective governors and senators, and formidable politicians. In a 24-year span 
during which many of the other states profiled here saw the gradual shift to Republican 
control, the Democratic Big Three ran for statewide office 36 times and won 34 times, 
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capturing an average of over 60 percent of the vote each time.67 This came even as 
Arkansas began to reliably vote Republican for president, save for native son Clinton in 
1992 and 1996. Blair suggests that the personal popularity of the Big Three helped to 
continue the popularity of the Democratic brand for many other Arkansas Democrats.68 
 
 
 
Chapter 9 
South Carolina 
 Among the four states under consideration here, South Carolina experienced 
perhaps the earliest and eventually most thorough shift toward the Republican Party. In 
1964, former Governor and then-Senator Strom Thurmond became the first Southern 
statewide elected official to switch parties and become a Republican. Popular memory of 
this seismic political event says that Thurmond – the former nominee of the segregationist 
States’ Rights Democratic Party in 1948 – was motivated by two national events: the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act and the presidential candidacy of Senator Barry Goldwater.69 
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This is partially true, as Thurmond consulted Goldwater on his eventual decision and 
bitterly denounced the Civil Rights Act on numerous occasions.70 
 However, local considerations in South Carolina both influenced Strom Thurmond’s 
decision and prevented other Southern Democrats who shared his philosophy from also 
joining the Republican Party, even as Alabama and Mississippi’s delegations walked out of 
the 1964 Democratic National Convention. Thurmond was up for reelection in 1966, and 
expected to face popular Governor Donald Russell in the Democratic primary. At the same 
time, the state legislature passed a bill that essentially banned Republicans and those 
attending Republican precinct events from voting in the Democratic primary.71 At a time 
when Goldwater fever was sweeping the state, the result would have been a Democratic 
primary electorate that was much less conservative, and therefore more hospitable to the 
moderate Russell. It was simply easier for Thurmond to be reelected by running as a 
Republican. 
 While Thurmond was unable to bring his fellow Southern senators with him into the 
GOP, he did bring many of his fellow South Carolinians into the fold to support his 
reelection. He was not, however, able to bring many elected officials in the state into the 
GOP along with him – a majority of the state’s congressional delegation remained 
Democratic, another Republican senator wouldn’t be elected until 2004, and a Republican 
governor wouldn’t be elected for a decade. Many voters in South Carolina supported 
Thurmond while continuing to vote for local Democrats due to the stranglehold the 
Democratic “courthouse crowd” 72 had on local offices.73 While it was easier for him to win 
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reelection as a Republican, he could not rely solely on Republican votes. As a result, 
Thurmond had to do some rather awkward political maneuvering as practically the only 
high-profile Republican in the state. This included encouraging local Republican candidates 
in the 1964 election to focus on winning the state for Goldwater rather than on trying to 
win office themselves – a move that ensured no animosity toward Thurmond among the 
“courthouse crowd” Democrats, but irritated the small but growing contingent of South 
Carolina Republicans.74 
 Thurmond continued to be easily reelected, and Richard Nixon carried the state in 
his 1972 landslide. Other South Carolina Republicans, however, were unable for quite some 
time to gain a foothold in elected office. In fact, Republicans did not even hold a statewide 
primary until 1974.75 This was largely due to the ability of the state Democratic Party to 
knit together a coalition keeping working-class, racially conservative whites in the party 
while at the same time expanding their outreach to the state’s substantial black 
population.76 In 1974, the state elected its first Republican governor since Reconstruction – 
yet this was less due to Republican ascendancy than to Democratic incompetence. The state 
Supreme Court ruled that the Democratic nominee – Charles “Pug” Ravenel – did not meet 
the state’s residency requirements, struck his name from the ballot and ordered a new 
candidate chosen. In a convention, Democrats chose William Jennings Bryan Dorn as a 
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replacement candidate. This process fractured the party and led to the election of 
Republican Governor James Edwards.77 
 In the mid-1980s South Carolina again elected a Republican governor, Carroll 
Campbell, after a bitter and divisive Democratic primary. He proved to be a popular, 
conservative governor, and was easily reelected. Yet this reelection was also driven in part 
by local concerns. Democrats nominated Theo Mitchell, a black state senator. Beyond the 
implicit racial issue of a black nominee, he made public comments about blacks supporting 
Campbell – calling them “house Negroes” and “uncle Toms,” explicitly injecting race into the 
campaign.78 The state’s last Democratic governor, Jim Hodges, was elected in 1998, 
following Republican incumbent David Beasley’s mishandling of a local issue – the 
Confederate flag flying over the state Capitol. First Beasley said it should remain flying, 
then said it should be taken down, then said it should be taken down but put back up above 
a Confederate memorial. On this truly local issue, Beasley managed to anger nearly all sides 
– with the NAACP threatening a boycott and angry whites selling bumper stickers reading 
“Dump the Governor – Keep the Flag.”79 
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Chapter 10 
Virginia 
 
 At first glance, Virginia appears to be a bit of a paradoxical case. More than any other 
state, it had a powerful, top-down Democratic organization – even more so than Wallace’s 
Alabama. The Byrd Organization held a stranglehold of control on virtually all state offices 
for decades, handpicked nominees, and enjoyed little opposition within the party.80 Yet at 
the same time, it cast its presidential votes for the Republicans more often than many other 
Southern states. While these factors may seem to be contradictory, they actually reinforced 
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one another. Harry Flood Byrd, Sr., the dean of Virginia politics during the 1940s and 50s, 
controlled the state’s Democratic Party, and reliably shepherded Democratic gubernatorial 
and senate candidates to victory.  
At the same time, however, Byrd displayed a “golden silence” on presidential races 
beginning with Harry Truman in 1948.81 In doing so, he gave Virginia Democrats tacit 
approval to split their tickets, and support a Republican presidential nominee. In fact, from 
1952 until 2004, only one Democratic presidential candidate would carry the 
Commonwealth of Virginia – Southerner Lyndon B. Johnson. 
 Byrd’s opposition to Truman and other national Democrats was borne largely out of 
his opposition to civil rights legislation. He took a leading role on the issue, infamously 
urging “massive resistance” and closing several county school districts in response to the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision. The presence of the hot-button race issue allowed the 
Byrd Organization to hold onto control of the state through much of the 1960s.82 By the end 
of the decade, however, the death of the senior Byrd and the reluctance of his son to take 
over led to an exceptionally weak Democratic Party.  
In 1969, after a three-way war for control of the Democratic Party among liberals, 
moderates and organization conservatives, Linwood Holton became the first Republican in 
a century to win Virginia’s governorship.83 Holton’s win came on the back of what was at 
the time the third largest turnout in state history, as well as a strong performance in the 
growing urban corridor.84 Continued Democratic infighting and increased influence of 
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liberals led to many elected officials and voters loyal to the organization jumping ship to 
the Republican Party. Ultimately, Republicans controlled Virginia’s governorship, both 
Senate seats and a majority of the House delegation.85 
 In 1981, Chuck Robb provided a blueprint for Democratic success in Virginia by 
winning the governorship running as a fiscal conservative and social progressive. Robb’s 
success in the governor’s mansion, particularly on intrinsically local issues such as a 
prosperous state economy and increased investment in educations, provided a pathway for 
Democrats to dominate Virginia’s governorship in the 1980s, even as the popularity of 
President Ronald Reagan pulled the country to the right. This stable of Democrats included 
L. Douglas Wilder – the first African American ever to be elected governor in the United 
States.86 
 However, in the 1993 governor’s election, Republican candidate George Allen put an 
end to the Democrats’ monopoly. In the campaign, he repeatedly attacked former 
governors Wilder and Robb, who had each grown less popular in later years.87 At the same 
time, Democratic candidate Mary Sue Terry faced an image problem of her own. As an 
unmarried woman, she was subject to implications from Republicans in the state that she 
was a lesbian, which harmed her reputation with the state’s generally conservative 
population. Among voters who said the most important quality in a candidate was a “good 
family life,” the married father Allen won over 90 percent of the vote.88 
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Chapter 11 
Commonalities and Differences 
 
 When examining the partisan composition of legislatures in each of the four states, 
some key differences in patterns emerge. The most important takeaway is that the ultimate 
decline of Democrats in these legislatures does not match that of the decline of Southern 
Democrats in Congress. As discussed above, the Alabama Democratic Party under George 
Wallace had a virtual stranglehold on the state. This is reflected in the composition of the 
legislature (Fig.9). Democratic control hovered near 100 percent until the 1980s. Arkansas 
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saw a similar level of sustained dominance (Fig. 10). 
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Yet in both of these legislatures, the 1994 Republican wave did not produce a major 
shift in Democratic strength. In Alabama, the number of Democrats sharply declined, but 
soon stabilized and even improved in the state Senate. In Arkansas, the wave barely 
registers on the chart of Democratic strength. In both Alabama and Arkansas, Republican 
control of the legislature did not come until the late 2000s, with a precipitous decline in 
both states during the 2010 Tea Party wave. 
Now, let us compare these two states – states that took until the 1980s or later to 
demonstrate sustained two-party competition – with South Carolina (Fig. 11) and Virginia 
(Fig. 12). One of these states saw its most powerful politician become a Republican early on 
in the South’s partisan evolution; the other saw the backbone of its state’s Democratic 
Party break in the late 1960s. 
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 We see a much different trend emerging. While the overall trend of all four 
legislatures is one of declining Democratic strength, in Virginia and South Carolina this 
trend comes much sooner and faster. This speaks to one commonality that the examined 
states exhibit: the effect that the presence of a single dominating political figure – a “party 
boss” – has on the state parties. Harry F. Byrd, Sr. kept the Democratic Party in near-
autocratic control of the levers of Virginia’s government for years (Fig. 12). After his death, 
with the absence of a strong leader (his son, Harry, Jr., showed little interest in party 
politics, and eventually left the Democratic Party, becoming the first Independent senator 
to be popularly elected) the party’s control of the state quickly evaporated, as Virginia 
elected its first Republican governor since Reconstruction, and its legislature’s composition 
changed dramatically (Fig. 12). The vacuum created by the demise of the Byrd Organization 
was the launching pad from which the Republican Party seized control of the 
Commonwealth. 
In South Carolina, perhaps the state’s most powerful and well-known Democrat was 
also one who was eager to buck the party line. Strom Thurmond may not have committed 
the ultimate Southern sin of becoming a Republican before the candidacy of Barry 
Goldwater, but he did run as a third-party candidate over a decade before the Civil Rights 
Act, cracking the Solid South in the process. It is hard not to imagine that without 
Thurmond, the nascent South Carolina Republican Party would have had a much harder 
time getting started, and they might not have had the early success relative to other 
Southern states that they did. 
To see a possible alternative reality had South Carolina’s Republican Party not had 
the early support of the state’s most prominent elected official, we need look no further 
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than Alabama. George Wallace effectively controlled the state’s politics from the day he was 
first elected governor until he left the governor’s mansion for the final time in the late 
1980’s. The presence of such a charismatic, powerful, singular political figure had a 
profound impact not only on the state’s Republican Party – which, despite having some 
ancestral members in isolated pockets of the state, languished under Wallace’s boot. It also 
affected the state’s Democratic Party in that, similar to Virginia, shortly after Wallace 
retired from politics, they were rudderless. We can see in Fig. 9 how quickly after Wallace’s 
final term Democrats began seeing substantial losses in the state legislature. 
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Chapter 12 
Conclusion – The Democratic Brand 
 
 There are numerous hypotheses as to why the South ultimately shifted to the 
Republican Party. Demographics and racial issues clearly played a role, as did increasing 
urbanization in some states. It is difficult if not impossible to say for sure which factor, if 
any, was the deciding factor. Rather, I hope to have engaged in some informed speculation 
on how local issues and events could have affected individual states’ partisan shifts. 
 While we cannot definitively say why the South ultimately became Republican, I 
argue that the ideological tension of the region and each individual state means that the 
principal factor cannot be ideological. While the Republican Party became dramatically 
more conservative at the same time that Southerners became dramatically more 
Republican, those same Southerners saw almost no change in ideological breakdown – 
where neither liberal, nor moderate, nor conservative Southerners made up a majority. 
Each state profiled had a rich tradition of ideological tension between areas of the state – 
from Alabama’s Southern Unionists and conservative gentry, to Arkansas’ Ozark farmers 
and cotton planters, to Virginia’s northern suburbs and rural Southside. There was and is 
no ideology that was definitively Southern, and therefore the South’s partisan change could 
not have been a primarily ideologically driven shift. 
 I believe the common thread in the four states examined here is the presence of a 
party boss or bosses who held the Democratic “brand” together. In Alabama and Arkansas, 
where either one or three powerful Democrats ruled the roost, the state stayed strongly 
Democratic. When they did cross the aisle and support statewide Republicans, it was 
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driven in no small part by concerns with specific Democratic candidates – not the 
Democratic Party in general. When these bosses stepped off the political stage, Democratic 
decline was not far behind. 
 In South Carolina and Virginia, a similar dynamic unfolded decades earlier than in 
Arkansas and Alabama. South Carolina’s most powerful politician was also the first truly 
prominent Southern Democrat to become a Republican. While the state did not 
immediately thereafter become loyal to the Republican Party, it did so far sooner than 
other states. In Virginia, the domineering organization of the state fractured and died in the 
late 60s, and the Democratic Party largely did with it. If a state had one or several strong, 
popular Democratic politicians – party bosses – they could delay the state’s total shift to the 
Republican Party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
Aisch, Gregor, Robert Gebeloff and Kevin Quealy. “Where We Came From and Where We 
Went, State by State.” New York Times, August 2014. 
 
Aistrup, Joseph A. The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in 
the South. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015. 
 
The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). THE ANES GUIDE TO 
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 
Center for Political Studies 
 
Bartley, Numan Vache., and Hugh Davis. Graham. Southern Politics and the Second 
Reconstruction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
 
Bass, Jack, and Walter DeVries. The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social change and 
Political Consequences Since 1945. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1995. 
 
Black, Earl, and Merle Black. The Rise of Southern Republicans. S.L.: Belknap Press, 2004. 
 
Black, Merle. “The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party.” The Journal of 
Politics 66 no. 4 (2004): 1001-017. Doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00287.x. 
 
Blair, Diane D. “The Big Three of Late Twentieth-Century Arkansas Politics: Dale Bumpers, 
Bill Clinton and David Pryor.” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 54, no. 1 (1991) 
 
Blair, Diane D., and Jay Barth. Arkansas Politics and Government. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2005. 
 
Bullock, Charles S., and Mark J. Rozell. The New Politics of the Old South: an Introduction to 
Southern Politics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 
 
Carter, Dan T. The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and 
the Transformation of American Politics. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1996. 
 
Cooper, Weldon Robert, and Thomas Robbins Weldon. Virginia Government and Politics: 
Reading and Comments. Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1976. 
 
Joseph Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America (Hill and Wang, 2013) Gregory Berke  
 
C.S Bullock III, “The South in Congress,” Contemporary Southern Politics (Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988), 
 
Heinemann, Ronald L. Harry Byrd of Virginia. Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1996. 
 
47 
 
 
Lamis, Alexander P. Southern Politics in the 1990s. Baton Rouge, La: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Larry Sabato, Virginia’s 1993 Elections: The 12 Year Itch Returns, University of Virginia 
News Letter, Vol. 70, No. 2 
 
Lea, James F. Contemporary Southern Politics. Baton Roughe, La: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1988. 
 
Murphy, Reg, and Hal Gulliver. The Southern Strategy. New York: Scribner, 1971. 
 
Norrell, Robert J. “Labor at the Ballot Box: Alabama Politics from the New Deal to the 
Dixiecrat Movement.” The Journal of Southern History 57, no. 2 (1991) 
 
“Politicocultural Regions in a Southern State: An Empirical Typology of Arkansas Counties.” 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 1977. 
Sampson, The Rise of the New Republican Party in South Carolina (Proquest Dissertations 
Publishing, 1984), 
 
“Senator Shelby Switch to Republican Party.” C-SPAN.org. Accessed April 18, 2017. 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?61471-1/senator-shelby-switch-republican-party 
 
Valentino, Nicholas A., and David O. Sears. “Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and 
Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South.” American Journal of Political Science 49, 
no. 3 (2005): 672-88: doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00136x 
 
Ward, John L. The Arkansas Rockefeller. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1978. 
 
Wilkinson, J. Harvie. Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics: 1945-1966. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984. 
 
